THE SITUATION OF WAR through which Colombia is currently passing isn’t new. It’s been present since the independence wars (1810-1819). At first it was between federalists and centralists, then between liberals and conservatives, the most important political parties in the country. This situation originated several internal wars, the most recent of which started on 9 April 1948 with the killing of the liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan.

This killing unleashed a civil war which lasted for a decade or so, known simply as ‘La Violencia’ (The Violence). The main difference between liberals and conservatives was their positions towards clericalism, making the liberal party the most radical option because they openly expressed their anti-clericalism in a country with a deep catholic tradition. The church, one of Colombia’s most important political forces, aligned itself with the conservatives and got to the point that they would even preach "Killing is a sin but killing liberals isn’t" and played an active role in war.

La Violencia reached one of its peaks in 1953 when General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla launched a coup d’état to ‘pacify’ the country, and it came to an end in 1958 when the treaty known as ‘El Frente Nacional’ (The National Front) was signed. In this treaty both parties agreed to take turns in power, a situation that lasted until 1978, when a liberal (Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala) was elected president after another liberal presidency (Alfonso Lopez Michelsen). By that time the differences between liberals and conservatives had practically disappeared.

The signing of this treaty resulted in the breakaway of the most radical elements within the liberal party, and led them to look towards Marxist doctrines, which were fashionable due to the influence of the Cuban revolution.

At the beginning of the 1960s several communist experiments were born, among them the commune which became known as ‘Marquetalia’ in the central part of Colombia. This commune was bombed and destroyed by the army in alliance with the US army (in what is known as the LASO operation). The very few survivors of this massacre, among whom was Manuel Marulanda Velez aka ‘Tirofijo’ (Sureshot), funded what was later to be known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). These ‘guerrillas’ would later declare war on the government – a war that has yet to end. The destruction of the commune led to the formation of several other guerrilla groups. Among the ones that can be mentioned are: ELN (National Liberation Army), M19 (April 19^th Movement), EPL (Popular Liberation Army), a co-ordination they tried to form in the 1980s called CGSB (Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Co-ordinator), and Quintin Lame (named after an indigenous outlaw, this was an indigenous guerrilla group).

The ‘Dirty war’ was crude, seriously weakening several of these groups, which would enter peace talks and return (‘re-insert’) into civilian life, ending up as political parties. One of these peace talks, in the mid-80s, caused the re-insertion of M19, that would then become the ‘M19 Democratic Alliance’, and of certain sides of FARC, which would become the Patriotic Union (UP). Later, ‘paramilitary’ groups [Ed. note: The term guerrilla is reserved for the left-wing.] would massacre many of the militants of these groups, including M19’s candidate (Carlos Pizarro Leon-Gomez) and two of UP’s candidates (Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa and Jaime Pardo Leal), all of them running for president in 1990s elections. This massacre included over 3,000 militants of UP during the following decade, as well as hundreds of different labour unionists, students, teachers human rights, left-wing and social activists etc.

This situation, which blocked alternative routes to power for these groups (a central point in the Marxist-Leninist discourse), intensified the war and took it to the point it is at today, the same point as when El Frente Nacional was signed, where what is being discussed is the share of power each group is going to have. There are two sides in struggle. Both are extremely militarist, both are convinced that they are capable of winning the war and both lack wide political support among the civil population. For both, their expectation is instead a political leadership based on economic and military strength.

Drug trafficking first appeared in Colombia at the end of the 1970s, centred on the northern coast, with what they used to call ‘Fiebre Marimbera’ (Weed Fever), focused on the growth and distribution of marijuana. It also generated the first US intervention with the introduction of ‘Paraquat’, a pesticide intended to eliminate illegal crops. Its consequence, as with subsequent experiments in the Colombian countryside, was a huge ecological disaster in the fumigated areas, harming the health of the inhabitants of the area and destroying legal crops essential to economic activity.

At the end of the 1970s the first cocaine exports occurred (mainly for the US market), and the most important distribution networks were created, which would later give birth to the drug cartels. Medellin Cartel was the most important one of all. It had its headquarters in the medium Magdalena River, where the two main barons, Pablo Escobar aka ‘El Patron’ and Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha aka ‘El Mexicano’, had their fortresses. The first baron was the brains of the operations and was in charge of the ‘sicario’ (paid assassins) schools, security in the cities, and the logistics of the distribution networks. The second was in charge of the security of the operations in the countryside since he was in command of the paramilitary groups in the area. Rodriguez Gacha had links with another member of the cartel: Fidel Castano, aka ‘Rambo’, also a radical anti-communist who started organising paramilitary groups in the areas of Cordoba and Uraba, near the border with Panama on the north-western coast. Castano’s groups are the most important paramilitary groups in Colombia at this moment. Both Castano and Rodriguez Gacha developed operations that included hiring Israeli mercenaries, such as Yair Klein, for military training of their troops. They did this in association with important banana export corporations such as Uniban in Uraba, as well as with the support of rich cattlemen in the area. It all started as a retaliation against taxing by the guerrillas through ‘vacuna’ (vaccine) which was a tax on cattle raising, and ‘boleteo’ (ticketing) which was a tax on urban economic activities such as trade. Other continual attacks from the guerrillas included kidnapping (in fact Rambo’s father was kidnapped and, after paying the requested ransom, his family only got back a corpse), and other forms of blackmail. Important sicarios were trained in the paramilitary camps. They would later train others in the sicario schools of the cities, mainly Medellin.

The legal army of Colombia, as well as the government, has also had several scandals that link it to drug-dealing activities. One example of this was when the previous government (under Ernesto Samper) had really difficult relations with the US due to scandals surrounding the economic support it had received from Cali’s cartel during its campaign. This even led the US government to withdraw the Colombian president’s US visa, along with those of six, three-sun generals (the highest rank in the Colombian military) on the grounds that they were related to drug trafficking activities. Another example was when several shipments of heroin were found on planes of the air force, such that the media named them the ‘Blue Cartel’ after the colour of their uniform.

It is also important to mention that drug dealing is one of few really profitable economic activities in Colombia [Ed. note: The others are oil and fruit). Therefore, it is central to the resources which are fuelling the current arms race of the legal and illegal forces in Colombia.

Recently, peace talks with FARC have been taking place in the southern ‘demilitarised’ area of San Vicente Del Caguan. The reality is that the so-called demilitarisation of this area is more of a smoke screen because FARC has traditionally had complete control over this area (which is the size of Switzerland but very poorly populated as it in the middle of the jungle), and the state and its military has never had a very active presence. The situation is so extreme that people who have lived in the area say that when there’s a legal argument about land, for example, that it won’t be solved by a police inspector, a judge or a lawyer, but by a guerrilla.

The main points being discussed are, from the FARC’s side, the complete dismantling of paramilitary groups by the government, as well as a complete change in the economic policies of privatisation of public companies that follow a neoliberal model. They suggest instead the implementation of a systematic nationalisation of all the resources and companies in charge of managing them. The government insist on the guerrillas stopping kidnappings and taxation of economic activities, and reaching a cease-fire treaty. This is with the idea of improving the conditions for foreign investment and obtaining credit from international financial institutions.

The government was traditionally using double-speak when referring to the guerrilla groups. When they talked about FARC they tended to talk about dialogue and about the need for a ‘political negotiation’. When they talked about ELN, they talked about the need of force to stop ‘terrorist activities’ and the state’s reluctance to bow to ‘armed blackmail’. However, ELN started a bombing campaign against the electrical power infrastructure of the most important provinces of Colombia (blowing up between 10 and 30 pylon towers a day) which led the state to reconsider their policies. Pre-talks were started that considered the ELN’s request that three towns be demilitarised to start the actual peace talks. This has generated a strong opposition in those areas, which is a mixture of popular discontent and paramilitary pressure.

The government has been imposing a series of both political and economic policies of a neoliberal nature. These are aimed at the privatisation of state resources based on the argument of a lack of efficiency of the institutions in charge of the administration of these resources on the one hand, and the supposed efficiency and transparency of private organisations on the other. All this departs from a lineal and economicist model of development, which doesn’t take into account any variables other than productivity. The model requires the modernisation of the infrastructure of the country, which includes dry ports, airports, river and sea harbours, the building of new highways and the modernisation of those now existing, and the optimisation of the conditions for foreign investment in the country.

Continuous fighting in certain areas of the country is always linked to certain centres of economic activity. In Uraba, for example, it has to do with the project of building another canal between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans along the Atrato River, now that the US is losing control over the Panama canal. It also has to do with the modernisation of the Turbo harbour, essential for the banana export activity, considered a priority in the Caribbean coast. Besides this, being so close to the Panama Canal provides a privileged situation when it comes to drug or arms trafficking. In Santander, in the north-eastern part of Colombia, paramilitary activity has to do with oil exploitation by multinationals such as BP and Oxy. It has traditionally been boycotted and sabotaged by ELN, which has the harbour of Barrancabermeja as one of its biggest fortresses, and this is in turn currently another big centre of paramilitary activity. In Valle del Cauca, paramilitary activity has much to do with the strong presence of guerrillas in the surroundings of Buenaventura, the main harbour on the pacific coast, and around the highway that connects this city with Cali, the third major city after Bogota and Medellin.

Finally, it’s important to mention the paradoxical effect of massive displacement (nearly 7% of the population). People migrate to big urban centres, stretching the shantytowns around these cities and worsening the situation of inequality that already exists. This could help take the war into an urban phase, one that the guerrillas have never been able to reach in more than 30 years of struggle, but now may help them regain the popular support they have been systematically losing. The paramilitaries are effectively helping the guerrilla groups gain this urban support, since they are mainly displacing those who they consider might be (or become) guerrilla supporters or sympathisers.

The money that the government is asking for is US $1.7 billion for the next two years. The US congress has already approved the giving of US $1.3 billion and the national government is lobbying around the EU to get the rest. More than 70% of this money is destined for the modernisation of the army (the biggest violators of human rights in the Western Hemisphere), including the purchase of equipment. The rest of the money will be invested in things such as ‘training on human rights’ for the army, maybe in the ‘School of Americas’ where most Latin-American dictators have been trained by the US Army.

The direct effect of this plan will be the revitalisation of the arms race within the conflict, because if the army gets US $1.3 billion in weapons and equipment, the guerrillas are likely to get another US $1.3 billion in weapons and equipment from their ‘Revolutionary Taxes’, kidnappings and their other ‘economic activities’. On the other hand, this support will make the already deadly and systematic violation of human rights in the hands of the army a lot more efficient.

Another consequence of Plan Colombia is the increased impoverishment of the population as a result of the US government’s economic support for improving the conditions for foreign investment and liberalisation of the market. This includes lower wages and fewer guarantees for workers, as well as lower taxes for multinationals, which means that even less money from local resources will stay in Colombia. It also includes worsening of living conditions for indigenous and black communities and other groups that oppose the neoliberal idea of development.

The current situation of war in Colombia and the everyday decreasing credibility of the guerrillas and their political programme have helped feed alternative movements of resistance. These come from the idea of civil unarmed resistance, and preach positions such as ‘Civil Disobedience’ as alternative strategies. Although they are generally reformist in nature, they have looked for creative ways to oppose official policies. One example is the highway blockades in certain areas of the country. They have been used by disparate groups such as the U’wa and other indigenous groups, as well as those who oppose the demilitarisation of the three municipalities for the peace talks with ELN. They achieved the isolation of some province capitals for more than a month after blocking the Pan-American Highway in the south-western part of Colombia. They took Pasto (capital of the Narino province) and Popayan (capital of Cauca province) to critical moments when supply distribution was damaged, causing losses which led the government to sit down and talk things over with the organisers of the blockade. The movement that opposes a demilitarised area for ELN isolated the northern coast of Colombia, causing a huge crisis for the cattle raising industry and for supply distribution in cities as important as Cartagena and Barranquilla (amongst the biggest eight cities of Colombia with millions of inhabitants).

Another example is that of the NGO’s who have been targeted by paramilitaries and who lost many of their militants over the last decade, resulting in their development of incredible networks of ‘contra-information’ that can now be used by radical activists.

On the other hand, the indigenous movements have a huge tradition of resistance. Quintin Lame, an indigenous person from Colombia, bears the record for the most times in prison in Colombia, due to his different activities of resistance, and an indigenous guerrilla group in the 1980s was named after him, as mentioned earlier. They were initially inspired by the Zapatistas in Mexico, then by the Mapuches in Chile, and finally by the indigenous movement in Ecuador, which withdrew two presidents from power during the last 10 years, and continue to be strong and combative. The most important examples of this struggle are the U’was in the eastern part of Colombia and the Embera-Katio communities in Uraba, in the north-west. What is special about these movements is that they have opposed the official policies and their model of development without adopting the idea of anti-imperialist and national liberation struggles. On the contrary, they have also opposed the nationalist idea that homogenises and stops them from affirming their traditions and beliefs within a state that excludes them from its social and economic policies. They have chosen to declare absolute independence from the programmes preached by both the guerrillas and the state. This has gained them enemies on both sides. On the other hand, the fact that they use different resistance techniques and categories from those of the guerrillas has helped crack their already worn-out discourse.

Apart from these movements, it’s important to mention the appearance of anarchist groups within the underground scene of the cities during the last decade. Initially some looked more like a copy of the anarcho-punk movement in Britain and the Radical Rock movement in the Basque Country in the 1980s. More recently they have created a more authentic identity, basically through the interchange of ideas with other groups in Latin America, especially Venezuela and Mexico. They have now begun to put their struggle in a more realistic context within the Colombian reality.

In Medellin, ‘Caminos’, maybe the first anarchist collective in the city, reached a peak in 1992 within the resistance movement against the celebration of the 500^th anniversary of the so-called discovery of America. Then came TURRA, some kind of a RASH (Red and Anarchist Skinheads) section in Medellin. Its main source of militants was both the punk and the skinhead movements in the city. It formed as a broad collective that included both Marxist and anarchist militants. It eventually broke up because the ideological differences between anarchists and certain Marxist groups (Leninists and Maoists) were impossible to reconcile as they were creating a sensation of incoherence within the group.

Currently, in Medellin, most groups are linked to the anarcho-punk movement, which is very influenced by the Mexican anarcho-punk movement linked to the Zapatista struggle. Examples of such groups are ‘La Sombra’ and CASO (Anarchist Collective for workers’ solidarity), even though the latter has strong connections with the anarcho-punk movement in Medellin, they have tried to reach a much broader population.

All these groups, plus the SHARP (Skin-Heads Against Racial Prejudice) section of Medellin, another collective called Red Juvenil (youth network) and some autonomous individuals, are part of a project called ‘Antimilitarismo Sonoro’ (Sounding Antimilitarism) which is probably the biggest autonomous project in Medellin and, perhaps, in Colombia. This collective aims to organise propaganda activities aimed at promoting conscientious objection to military conscription (which is illegal in Colombia at this moment) and against police brutality from an antimilitarist position. The hierarchical and authoritarian structure of any army and thus of all the armed actors of the Colombian conflict: Colombian army, police, paramilitaries and guerrillas, is challenged.

The idea has been from the beginning to establish a clear position and to break from the traditional discourse of the left (armed and legal) of a very strong Marxist-Leninist tradition, looking for new and creative ways to carry out propaganda activities, such as cultural activities within the independent music scene in the city. Several concerts have been put together by the collective, the biggest of which took place last year with two bands from Argentina (Todos Tus Muertos and Lumumba) and two local bands (Niquitown and Sociedad FB7). Between 8,000 and 10,000 people attended this free concert in one of the poorest neighbourhoods of the city even though there was a boycott of the event by the mass media. Many goals were achieved by this concert, specifically by more collectives getting involved in the project. It was mostly organised by Red Juvenil and some individuals, but there were four collectives involved in the following concert and there should be even more in the next one.

Another concert was organised on 13 May 2000 to commemorate the international day against military conscription. Only local underground bands played, but some 3,000 people attended. The bands that played that day were Rechazo (punk), Beto el Recluta (ska and reggae), Lo que Queda (punk), Laberinto (hip hop), Tribu Omerta (hip hop) and Rulaz Plazko (hip hop).

Future plans for this year include a compilation CD and antimilitarist book that will include bands from all over the Spanish speaking world and some from other parts, for example Robb Johnson from the UK. We are also thinking about our next concert. We plan to get Fermin Muguruza (well-known radical Basque musician) to play in Medellin, hopefully on 26 September, and to do some smaller benefit concerts to help us become self-sufficient.

We have also been working with a group concerned with civil opposition to police brutality, involving propaganda against state policies to recover ‘Public Space’, which have affected thousands of street vendors and youths who have been brutalised in certain squares which the police want to kick them out of. Some activities include sabotaging collective arrests from the inside by getting arrested and then, through a legal support network that has been built for both this and the anti-conscription groups, getting released with all the other people that have been illegally arrested. There is also a graphic arts collective working on a boycott against these policies. Other activities include publishing posters and leaflets with legal information in case of police harassment mainly in relation with the amount and types of ‘drugs’ that can actually be carried according to the constitution. We’re also working in high schools promoting conscientious objection to military conscription and our legal support groups that include several actual objectors.

Another important point in Antimilitarismo Sonoro is breaking away from state sponsored campaigns against the war that intend to blame it all on the guerrillas and do not take into account the role of the legal army and the paramilitary groups. That’s why we are very clear about our opposition to any kind of army.

The current plan is to get a second-hand sound system with a 16 or 24 channel mixer and at least 5,000 Watts of power to do our concerts and to be able to self-manage the project. People from different groups such as the AF and RTS all over the UK, the Rainbow Centre in Nottingham, the Autonomous Centre in Edinburgh and Glasgow, etc. have already expressed willingness to help with this, and any further suggestions are welcome at this email address: corleone69@hotmail.com, or this postal address (No name please):

A.A. 54413

Medellin,

Colombia.

South America