The Balkan states share more things than they would like to admit. Their fates in the supposed “powder-keg of Europe” are closely intertwined, not least through myths and cultures. Krali Marko is a hero for Serbians, Bulgarians and Macedonians, the drink slivovica has its counterpart in rakia or raki, and of course minorities get left on the ‘wrong’ side of the border. What the Second World War managed to ‘solve’ in Central Europe, with more or less ethnically homogenous states (there are a few exceptions of course) being created thanks to a genocidal policy and mass movements both East and West in the last months of the war, it didn’t do the same in the region between the Black and Adriatic seas.
What runs through the region is a shared accentuated nationalism, arising from defensive reactions between neighbours. As the recent example in Serbia and Kosovo has shown, the problem always stems from an uneasy domestic situation. The history of the Balkans is actually littered with some surprising tolerance of minorities. Tito’s Yugoslavia was a good example, Mazower paints a picture of a heterogeneous but prosperous Salonica in his City Of Ghosts, and Bulgaria saved its Jews from the Holocaust. Yet the nineties and the first years of the 21st Century have seen conflicts arise again. After the horrors of the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, many things remained unsolved – Kosovo’s independence and the consequences for the diminishing, shrinking Serbian republic; the status of the Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia, poised precariously between a true independence, claims to its name by Greece and conflicts over history with Bulgaria. The root cause of all this is nationalism of a peculiar Balkan variety.
Names and images pop up when we think of nationalism in the Balkans – Milosevic, Srebrenica, paramilitaries, that famous song by Goran Bregovic – “Kalashnikov”. Most are, of course, linked with the former Yugoslavia. But there are the other “quiet” nationalisms that are as potentially dangerous if not more. The accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the European Union in 2007 not only brought Cyrillic, more corruption and a new Daily Mail campaign against. It also enabled the creation of the right-wing and nationalist Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty group in the European parliament, a group that now doesn’t exist due to the fallout after Italian measures against Romanian immigrants prompted the Greater Romanian Party to withdraw from this coalition. However short-lived, the ability for this group to emerge, thanks to two quite insignificant players in European politics, does point to the strength of nationalism in these two relatively stable Balkans countries.
Bulgaria and “Bulgarisation”
The example of Bulgaria is illustrative of the continuing problems in the peninsula. Bulgaria is a country of nearly eight million people, with a history of toleration of minorities and with a substantial Roma and ethnic Turk population. For years, even under the Ottoman rule that was endured for nearly five centuries, ethnic Bulgarians and ethnic Turks could live door to door. The program of the Bulgarian Central Revolutionary Committee, the 1870s organisation for the liberation of the country forbad Bulgarians from attacking ordinary Turkish citizens in the struggle for independence. This stability did continue into the 1980s until Todor Zhivkov, the infamous ruler for the majority of the People’s Republic’s life, started a campaign for “Bulgarisation” of the Turks in Bulgaria, forcing them to change their names, resulting in almost 300,000 leaving the country. The mid-to-late 1980s climate of terrorism by ethnic Turks, police actions against whole villages in their drive to “Bulgarise” them and then the sudden collapse of the monolithic state threw things wide into the open. Rampant privatisation and ineffectual government of the nineties left a legacy of division that simply did not exist before. Many Roma families, left without the jobs provided for them under communism, fell into poverty and crime. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) monopolised the Turk vote and has been an element of every coalition government since its inception. Unemployment rose generally.
Latent nationalism lifts its head
It was, in short, a good climate for latent nationalism to come to the fore – one that was present since the 80s. The National Union Ataka is the natural outgrowth of this. This is a party that was created only two months before the 2005 legislative elections, a coalition of insignificant right-wing and ex-communist splinters. It managed to win 9% of the popular vote in June of that year, bagging 21 seats out of 240 in parliament. Little, you might say, but considering it was running against parties with decades long histories such as the Socialist Party (BSP) or ones that had already had a stint in office such as the National Movement Simeon II (NMSII), it is no mean feat. What’s more, its leader – Volen Siderov – managed to poll 25% at the presidential elections of 2006. He was the only candidate apart from the winner, Georgi Parvanov, who made it to the second round, brought about by low voter turnout. For a party that is based around a strong Fuhrerprinzip (leader principle akin to that in Nazi Germany), that is significant.
This use of evocative language by the author is of course, deliberate. The party has been called fascist by many, and its members do appropriate the jackbooted style of many ultranationalist groupings. A closer examination of its stances, set out in the “20 Points of Ataka”, reveals a nationalist, populist party. What are its main currents? At the heart of Ataka’s political program lies a statement that Bulgaria is a monolithic, one-nation state, indivisible along ethnic or religious lines. The party also attacks the MRF and the national channel’s news in Turkish indirectly by stating that the national language is Bulgarian only, and that any ethnic parties should be prohibited. The party also supports an ill-defined criminalisation of verbal attacks on national “holies”. On economic issues, it supports a protectionist policy and state provision of health, social security and “spiritual and material prosperity” for all citizens. The party aims for isolationist foreign policies, including a withdrawal from NATO, operations in the Middle East and the expulsion of US bases from national soil. Quite apart from that, unofficially but widely supported, is the inclusion of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in political decisions – a de-facto merging of state and church.
What emerges is a party that cleverly combines populist policies designed to appeal to both business people and the common person on economic ground, and a tapping of cultural chauvinism that is an expression of dissatisfactions on the part of many Bulgarians with the current state of affairs. It is easy to blame Romas for crimes and the West for poor conditions and whipping up the historical Turkish threat is also popular. Calling to spirituality, which is on the upswing amongst the traditionally conservative country, is also a good source of support. The official program of Ataka is worrying enough – it would create a state based on ethnic supremacy where other ethnic groups would not be allowed to be heard in the political process.
Traditional scapegoats
Privately, things are worse. The author himself has seen the graffiti – “all gypsies into soap” – and a visit to the forums of Ataka’s newspaper would reveal what its members really want. Complete social regression is the norm of the day, the ideals of Christianity imposed on all society; scapegoating of the traditional suspects – Romas and ethnic Turks which goes hand-in-hand with anti-Semitism (which Siderov himself is guilty of in his various books). Ataka is not a fascist party then - if it was it would by easy for people to dismiss it. It is an ultranationalist entity that has addressed real poverty, income disparity, crime and corruption at the highest levels of politics in radical ways – nationalisation, exclusion of foreign business in preference for domestic firms, for example. At the same time it has taken unofficial harsh actions against ethnic minorities and has branded the current government as one of Turks and not Bulgarians. Centred around a charismatic ‘strong’ and ‘intelligent’ leader figure with a sharp tongue, the party is rallying social conservativism and economic promises that hark back to an almost quasi-Communist state of the nostalgic yesteryear. Alongside Christianity and populist history that is directed against “those other Bulgarians – the Macedonians” the party has a strong base from which to build on.
The consequences would be disastrous, of course. Bulgaria is not faced with the same problems that Serbia is – sectarian troubles – but it has a very sizable and growing Roma population while the nominally Bulgarian population is facing a demographic collapse, a Roma population that, it has to be noted, was not forced to revert to crime when they had housing, educational and job prospects in the years of Communism (not to excuse that state of affairs, of course). But rational debate is thin on the ground in Bulgaria. The popular media is distinctly patriotic, as in the popular history show of Bozhidar Dimitrov that champions any Bulgarian achievement with little academic justification, plus Ataka with its own channel. People find it easier to blame others rather than take action themselves. You might say that the election results show little, yet the voter turnout has always been extremely low – under 50% - and Ataka can only grow, with many of the voters who didn’t support the party in 2005 now turning towards it. The last polls in Bulgaria showed the party second in popularity only to the ruling Socialists. When the generation of the “red grandmas” – the elderly who vote Socialist out of nostalgia and promises of social security – leaves the political scene, and with some flocking to a party that is also promising pensions, who knows what might happen?
What we are facing is quite frankly a quiet nationalism rising up in a country that, for the Balkans, is stable and on the upsurge in economic terms. This nationalism threatens civil war between ethnic groups, even if a Kosovo scenario is unlikely because there are no real regions in the country that could secede or are likely to do so (even where ethnic Bulgarians are the minority). Time will tell. The next legislative elections will show whether the nationalist party have retained their appeal. But as long as it manages to play at its populist game while the establishment does nothing to address organised crime and corruption among its own ranks, the mentality of the population is unlikely to change. With the centre and centre-right of the political spectrum fractured in a way that we only think Communists can follow, there are few alternatives to the status quo in a political sense. Whilst everyone looks to Serbia or the Caucuses for the obvious signs of nationalism and ethnic trouble – as has been fashionable for a long time, a quiet, ‘unfashionable’ force is arising in a country that the EU would like to portray as a model for the Western Balkans.
Bulgarian anarchism
Unfortunately outside the parliamentary alternatives, the grassroots base of activism in Bulgaria is currently weak, although the Federation of Anarchists in Bulgaria (FAB) is fighting hard to raise awareness of issues, and there are tactical struggles that are rays of light. Amongst these campaigns were the eco-protests of summer 2007 which aimed to preserve the Strandzha mountains as a national park, since the land there was being sold to developers. Despite the High Administrative Court’s dismissal of the case, a genuine and popular campaign sprung up in many towns and cities in Bulgaria. Residents protested against the Sofia Council’s inactivity over the landfill in the capital’s Suhidol quarter, employing peaceful protest to fight for a cleaner living space in the face of disinterest on the authorities’ part. But overall, Bulgarians seem reluctant to organise in a de-centralised manner. The hardships of transitional life (as Bulgaria is still in transition) could be a catalyst for activity – or apathy, but so far the latter has come out on top. From a purely theoretical standpoint, Bulgaria has both currents of anarchist and dictatorial thought that have been evident throughout its history. Georgi Cheitanov is just one of the names that stands out amongst the ranks of Bulgarian anti-state activists. But, without trying to make sweeping statements about the history and culture of Bulgaria, it is a fact that 55 years of the twentieth century were spent under some sort of authoritarian regime, while early governments of post-Liberation Bulgaria were also prone to excesses.
This situation has created a dual attitude to the left as well. It is automatically associated with the communist rule post-1944 which saw the country become the staunchest Soviet ally. Nostalgia, so common in the Eastern Bloc, harks back to the state socialism of “Bai Tosho” (the affectionate nick-name given to the Communist Leader Zhivkov) while any attack on that period by the centre and right is seen as an indictment of all left ideas apart from the most watered-down social democracy. The bogey-man of state socialism is exemplary of the binaries that often dominate traditional Bulgarian discourse – either communism or democracy; Europe or Russia; national hero or national traitor. This is a state of affairs that is not given to tactical action. Yet, this gloomy picture may reveal why Ataka rose. There are no absolutes and it cannot be said that this is the “Bulgarian nature” any more than one can talk of immutable human nature. The spread of independent media is still not as wide as in the West, but local action can only grow and come out of the post-Communist shadows of derelict trade unions with no power. Until that tipping point in the public mind is reached though, the far right still poses a significant danger to the integrity of all classes and ethnicities in the country, capitalising on simplified “black or white” politics.
Scapegoating is easier than action. And we know what that has meant in the Balkans…
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Postscript: The International of Anarchist Federations (IAF or IFA, http://www.iaf-ifa.org) was founded during an international anarchist conference in Carrara, Italy, in 1968 by the three existing European federations of France, Italy and Spain as well as the Bulgarian federation in french exile. Things are now much improved. The IAF-IFA has grown in members in the past decades, including the Anarchist Federation (see www.iaf-ifa.org) and will meet in Carrara again this year for its 40th anniversary congress. Plus, the FAB is alive and well in Bulgaria once more, and we are very pleased to announce that they have, in recent months, made contact with autonomous groups in Turkey, which we hope will come to be an antidote to the poison of nationalism described in this article.